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APPELLENTS' REPLY BRIEF 
INTRODUCTION 
CASE NO. 17600 
Respondent does not dispute that one loaning money to 
a motor vehicle dealer is entitled to the protection of the 
dealer's bond required by Utah law. Respondent contends, however, 
that the Complaints in these actions were properly dismissed and 
that Appellants should not be given leave to amend the Complaints 
because Appellants supposedly alleged in their Complaints that 
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they were joint venturers with Call Auto & Equipment Sales, 
Inc. ("Call Auto"), the dealer covered by the bond issued by 
Respondent, which supposed allegation Appellants should not 
now be allowed to contradict by Amended Complaints, because 
Appellants did not supposedly seek leave to amend their 
Complaints in a timely fashion, and because even if the 
Appellants were not joint venturers with Call Auto but rather 
made loans to Call Auto, that such loans were supposedly 
usurious and Appellants cannot recover anything on the trans· 
actions, not even the principal amount of the loans. For 
the reasons hereinafter set forth, it is respectfully sub-
mitted that these contentions are without merit and that 
the Judgments appealed from should be reversed. 
I. APPELLANTS HAVE NOT JUDICIALLY ADMITTED THEY WERE 
JOINT VENTURERS WITH DEFENDANT CALL AUTO. 
Respondent argues (R.B. 6-7) 1 that Appellants have 
alleged in their Complaints that they were engaged in joint 
ventures with Call Auto & Equipment Sales, Inc. , and that such 
allegations constitute judicial admissions so that there was 
no issue to be determined by the Court or Jury concerning the 
relationship between the parties. This contention is ground· 
less for a number of reasons. 
1 Respondent's Brief is cited as "R. B. ". 
Appellants' Opening Brief is cited a~Bo 
The Betenson record is cited as "B.R. ,,.....-
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A. Appellants Have Not Alleged In Their Complaints 
That They Were Engaged In Joint Ventures With Call Auto. 
Respondent claims that in paragraph 7 of the Betenson 
Complaint, Appellants have alleged the existence of a joint 
venture between the parties. As is clear from a reading of 
that paragraph, the Betenson Appellants simply allege therein 
the representations which were made 2z Defendants when they 
approached Appellant Betenson for money. The paragraph does 
not allege that a joint venture was entered into or ever 
existed between the parties. To the contrary, the factual 
allegations contained in paragraph 7 make it clear that the 
"joint venture" term used by the Defendants in soliciting 
Appellants did not accurately describe the relationship at 
all. Thus, it is alleged that Defendants solicited Plaintiff 
Betenson for the purpose of raising funds for the corporate 
Defendants which those Defendants needed to purchase equipment 
in their business. It is further alleged that the money would 
be at all times fully secured and that Plaintiff Betenson 
would receive a guaranteed profit. No where is there any allega-
tion that any of the Appellants would have anything to do with 
the ownership, management or operation of the business or have 
any right of control over that business or that the return on 
Appellants' money would in any way be dependent upon the amount 
of profits earned in the business or that Appellants would be 
responsible in any way for any losses of the business. 
-3-
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Under the authorities cited in our opening Brief 
(A.B. 9-15), it is clear that the foregoing allegations do 
not constitute allegations sufficient to give rise to the 
creation of a joint venture. The fact that Defendants used 
the term "joint venture" in soliciting one of the Appellants 
is totally irrelevant. The situation is no different than 
if Defendants had solicited Appellants to give them a "gift" 
of $5, 000. 00 on the condition that within one year Defendants 
would guarantee to repay that "gift" with a guaranteed profit. 
The mere characterization of the transaction as a "gift" would 
be meaningless and it would be clear to everyone that the 
transaction legally constituted a loan. 
Paragraph 9 of the Betenson Complaint makes it even 
more clear that the Betenson Appellants have not alleged that 
1 
they entered into a joint venture with any of the Defendants:" 
"On or about April 4, 1980, Plaintiff Eddy N. 
Betenson • • . entered into a written agree-
ment with Defendant Call Auto & Equipment Sales, 
Inc .••. pursuant to which Betenson agreed 
to and did pay to said Defendant the sum of 
$7,000.00, which was to be utilized by said 
Defendant to purchase and sale various types 
of personal property and equipment in its 
business. In consideration for such payment, 
said Defendant agreed and guaranteed to pat 
to Betenson in various install~ents on or efore 
Ju t e sum o to ive 
to 
2 The same standard allegations are contained in the Complair.: 
for the other loans made by the Betenson Appellants. 
-4-
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ersonal ro ert and e ui ment as securit 
or sue investment .... T erea ter t e 
parties agreed to various extensions for the 
repayment of the final installment of $7,000.00 
to September 8, 1980." [Emphasis added] 
Nowhere in this paragraph is there any allegation of the crea-
tion of a joint venture between the parties, but simply the 
allegation of a debtor-creditor relationship between the parties. 
In addition, even if Respondent were correct that 
paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Betenson Complaint allege the crea-
tion of a joint venture between the parties, the~ Complaint 
contains no such allegations. The transaction in which Mr. 
and Mrs. Lowin loaned money to Call Auto was completely 
separate from the transactions alleged in the Betenson Complaint 
and none of the Betenson Appellants had any involvement whatso-
ever in the Lowin transaction. Paragraph 7 of the ~ 
Complaint simply alleges that the Lowins entered into a 
written agreement with Call Auto pursuant to which they paid 
Call Auto $30,000.00, which was to be utilized by Call Auto 
to purchase, refurbish and sell personal property and equip-
ment in its business and that in consideration therefor Call 
Auto agreed to pay Plaintiffs the sum of $750.00 per month 
until April 26, 1981, at which time the Lowins would be repaid 
the $30,000.00, and that Plaintiffs' money would at all times 
be secured. 
-5-
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B. Even If Appellants Had Alleged In The Origin!!_ 
Complaints That A Joint Venture Existed, Such Allegation Woulc 
Not Constitute A Judicial Admission Barring The Filing Of 
An Amended Complaint. 
Even if Appellants had alleged in their original 
Complaints that a joint venture existed between the parties, 
Respondent's contention that such allegation constitutes a 
"Judicial admission" which is binding upon Appellants and 
that Appellants cannot amend their Complaints to plead facts 
"in direct contradiction" to the facts alleged in their orig· 
inal Complaints is erroneous. 3 
In the first place, the allegation that a "joint 
venture" existed would clearly be a conclusion of law and not 
a factual allegation. Neither the parties nor the Court are 
bound by conclusions of law contained in pleadings and legal 
conclusions cannot be judicial admissions. See, ~· GiaMo:< 
v. United States Steel Corp., 238 F.2d 544 (3rd Cir. 1956); 
Jones v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 18 F.R.D. 181 (M.D. Penn. 1955). 
More importantly, the fact that a pleader seeks to 
contradict factual allegations contained in a prior pleading 
3 In this connection, Respondent claims that Appellants 
"submitted the matter for decision to the lower Court upor. 
the premise that a joint venturer is entitled to recover 
against a dealer's bond". This argument, a~ ResI?or_ident f'' 
well knows completely misstates Appellants position be.-· 
' 11 h · tl and uni· the District Court. Appe ants ave consisten Y b 
formly contended that no joint venture existed between t.~. 
parties, that the transactions we:e loar_is and that onermalv 
a loan to a motor vehicle dealer is entitled to recove 
under the dealer's bond. ~. ~.B.R. 130 & 158 · 
-6-
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is not a basis for denying leave to amend unless leave is sought 
in bad faith or unless leave to amend would seriously prejudice 
the other party. 
For example, in Beeck v. Aquaslide "N" Dive Corp., 
67 F.R.D. 411 (M.D. Ill. 1975), the Defendant had filed an 
Answer admitting that it manufactured the slide on which 
Plaintiff was injured. Over a year later, Defendant sought 
leave to amend its Answer to deny that it manufactured the 
slide. The Court granted leave to amend on the basis that it 
did not appear that Defendant was acting in bad faith and 
Plaintiff would not be unduly prejudiced by the amendment. 
Similarly, in United Steel Workers of America, 
A.F.L.-C.I.O. v. Mesker Bros. Industries, Inc., 457 F.2d 91 
(8th Cir. 1972), the Plaintiff had alleged in its original 
Complaint that "in car"t"ying out its collective bargaining 
obligations" under the terms of a collective bargaining agree-
ment, the Defendant employer had obtained an insurance policy 
insuring Plaintiff with respect to certain injuries. On the 
basis of such allegation, the lower Court had dismissed the 
Complaint because the Complaint itself indicated that the 
Defendant had complied with its obligations under the collective 
bargaining agreement to obtain insurance. The Plaintiff moved 
to amend its Complaint, contending that it was not their inten-
tion to imply that the coverage which Defendant had actually 
obtained did in fact meet the requirements of the collective 
bargaining agreement. The District Court refused to allow 
-7-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Plaintiff leave to amend. The Court of Appeals reversed the 
District Court and allowed Plaintiff leave to amend to clear 
up any ambiguity. 
Finally, in Jackson v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co, 
212 P.2d 591 (Cal. 1950), the Plaintiff brought an action to 
recover for injuries suffered in a truck accident. The orig· 
inal Complaint alleged that an employee/ employer relationship 
existed between Plaintiff and Defendant, which relationship 
would completely bar Plaintiff's action as the Workmen's 
Compensation Act provided the exclusive remedy. The lower 
Court had sustained a demurrer to the Complaint without leave 
to amend on the basis that Plaintiff could not contradict the 
allegation of an employer/employee relationship contained in 
the Complaint. The Appellate Court reversed and granted leave 
to amend stating: 
"The province and purpose of the law is to 
ascertain the real facts and to administer 
justice in the light of such facts. It would 
seem to be a travesty on justice if a litigant 
had inadvertently, ignorantly and erroneously 
stated as a fact, without fault on his part, 
an admission against interest, if he were to 
become bound thereby and would not be permitted 
upon proper showing to correct the innocent error 
and assert the true fact in that regard. 
II 
"If courts were to bind litigants to inadvertent 
untrue statements of facts and forbid them the 
inherent right to correct faults by substituting 
the true facts, they would become partisans to 
miscarriages of justice. Our courts not only 
permit, but strive to elicit, .the true fa~ts of 
all cases and to render justice by applying 
the law t~ such facts." (Id. at 594-95) 
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To the same effect, ~Macomber v. State of California, 58 
Cal.Rptr. 393 (Cal. 1967) ("rules of pleading are conveniences 
to promote justice and not to impede or warp it."); Avalon 
Painting Co. v. Alert Lumber Co., 44 Cal.Rptr. 90 (Cal. 1965); 
Freidberg v. Freidberg, 88 Cal.Rptr. 451 (Cal. 1970); Bank 
of America v. Lamb Finance Co., 303 P.2d 86 (Cal. 1956) 
(amendment should be allowed to "clarify ambiguities, amend, 
insufficiencies, eliminate surplusage or explain mistaken 
statements, if any."); 3 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, §15.08(2] 
at p. 1571. 
Nor do the authorities cited by Respondent in support 
of its contention that Appellants cannot amend to "contradict" 
the "judicial admission that a joint venture existed" support 
that position. In Estate of Clarence Henry McFarland v. Holt, 
417 P.2d 244 (Ut. 1966), cited by Respondent, the Executrix 
under a will petitioned for an Order confirming the sale of 
real property. The Court entered an Order of Confirmation 
pursuant to such request. The Executrix subsequently sought to 
set aside such Order on the basis that her own petition filed 
to confirm the sale had been insufficient. The Court held 
that her petition had in fact been sufficient and further noted 
that the Executrix should not thereafter be permitted to repu-
diate the petition for the purpose of upsetting the action which 
the Court had taken. That case has nothing to do with amending 
pleadings. In Myers v. Carter, 556 P.2d 703 (Ore. 1976), cited 
-9-
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by Respondent, the case had actually been tried before a · Jury 
with the admission contained in the pleading and no leave to 
amend was ever sought. Thus, the Court held that it was error 
to submit the issue to the jury for decision which had already 
been admitted in the pleadings. 
In summary, Appellants do not believe that they alle~, 
in their original Complaints that a joint venture existed. 
However, if this Court rules otherwise, Appellants should be 
given the opportunity to amend their Complaints to clarify 
their previous allegations. Such a ruling would clearly be in 
the interest of justice as it would result in the determinatio: 
of the merits of this claim on the facts rather than on the 
form of the pleadings and there is absolutely no showing that 
such amendment is being sought in bad faith or that Respondent 
would be prejudiced in any manner by such amendment. 
II. APPELLANTS ARE NOT BOUND BY THE "JOINT VENTURE" 
LANGUAGE OF THE WRITTEN AGREEMENTS. 
Respondent states in its Brief (R.B. 13) that Appella: 
contend that although the written agreements expressly provide 
for a joint venture, Appellants should be allowed to introduc• 
evidence that the parties to the agreements intended otherwise 
This is a misstatement of Appellants' position. Appellants 
contend that the terms of the written agreements themselves 
clearly do not constitute a joint venture, but even if such 
terms did constitute a joint venture, based upon the authoriti' 
cited in our opening Brief (A.B.8-12), Appellants are entitleG 
to introduce evidence that in fact a joint venture was not 
-10-
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intended by the parties and did not in fact exist. 
Respondent admits that the provisions of the written 
agreements are not determinative on the existence of a joint 
venture between the parties to the written agreements, but 
argues that the "joint venture" language of the agreements is 
binding upon Appellants as to Respondent who was not a party 
to the agreements. The cases cited by Respondent do not 
support this contention. 
In James Weller, Inc. v. Hansen, 517 P.2d 1110 
(Ariz. App. 1973), a case cited by Respondent, the Court simply 
held that although between the parties to a contract their 
intent to form a joint venture is essential, "as to third 
parties, the relation will be determined from the facts rather 
than the conclusions of the co-partners as to the nature of 
their business relationship." (Id. at 1115) There was no 
contention that the terms of the written agreement did not 
accurately set forth the true relationship that existed between 
the parties. Thus, the Court examined the written contract 
between the two claimed joint venturers and determined that 
the agreement by which the house was to be built and sold and 
the parties were each to receive one-half of the profits from 
such enterprise in fact constituted a joint venture agreement. 
In determining that a joint venture existed, the Court set 
forth the elements of a joint venture as follows: 
"(l) a contract, (2) a common purpose, (3) a 
community of interest, and (4) an equal right 
of control •.. 
-11-
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"~t must appear as a part of the agreement 
either expressly or by necessary implication, 
that each of the parties to such joint adven-
ture has authority to act for all in respect 
to the control of the means or agencies employed 
to execute such cormnon purpose. 
II 
"Where there is a question of a joint adventure 
each case must be decided upon its own facts .. '." (Id at 1115) 
The Weller Court simply determined from the facts 
concerning the relationship between the parties that a joint 
venture existed. Appellants in the case at bar simply ask 
for the opportunity to factually prove that no joint venture 
existed. 
In Stearns v. Williams, 240 P.2d 833 (Id. 1952), a 
case cited by Respondent, the Court simply held that as to 
third persons not a party to the contract, "the legal and not 
the actual intention controls." (Id. at 839) In other words, 
as to third persons, even if the parties to the contract did 
not actually intend to create a joint venture, if the facts 
show the relationship constitute a joint venture, then as to 
third parties a joint venture would exist. Again, the Court 
in Stearns recognized that whether a joint venture existed is 
primarily a question of fact and that the parties to a joint 
venture must have a unity of interest in the objects or pur· 
poses of the agreement. 
In Utah, the circumstances under which a person may 
be bound as a partner (or a joint venturer) by estoppel even 
though no partnership in fact existed are spelled out by 
0 
statute. Section 48-1-13, Utah Code Anno. (1953), provides 
h . lf or consents to another'; that where a person represents imse 
-12-
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representing him to anyone as a partner, that even though he 
is not an actual partner he is liable to any person to whom 
the representation has been made who relied upon such represen-
tation in giving credit to the partnership. It is settled 
under the Utah statute that in order to make one a partner 
or a joint venturer by estoppel, it is absolutely essential 
that the third party have relied on the representation of 
partnership. Phillips Manufacturing Co. v. Putnam, 405 P.2d 
1376 (Ut. 1973). 
In the present case, it is clear that even if the 
intention of Appellants and Call Auto is disregarded, the terms 
of the agreements between the parties and the facts of the 
relationship that actually existed are not such as to legally 
constitute a joint venture, but, rather, show a debtor/creditor 
relationship between the parties. Furthermore, under the Utah 
statute, it is clear that Respondent in no way relied upon the 
"joint venture" language in the agreements either in issuing 
the dealer's bond in favor of Call Auto approximately two years 
prior to the first transaction with Appellants, or in continuing 
that bond in effect. 
III. APPELLANTS DID TIMELY MOVE FOR LEAVE TO 
AMEND THEIR COMPLAINTS IN THE COURT BELOW. 
Respondent argues that Appellants did not move for 
leave to amend their Complaints prior to the entry of the Orders 
of Dismissal and that even though Appellants' Motions for 
-13-
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Reconsideration or Modification stated as ground for the 
Motions that Appellants were entitled to amend the Complaints, 
such motions were improper and leave to amend could not have 
been granted by the Court both because the Court could not 
properly reconsider its prior ruling and because leave to amer.: 
a Complaint cannot be granted after the Complaint has already 
been dismissed. These contentions are without merit. 
First, Appellants' counsel did in fact, at the 
hearing on Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, request leave to 
amend the Complaints in the event the District Court felt that 
the original Complaints were defective. When, after taking th; 
matter under advisement, the District Court granted the Motior.: 
to Dismiss ~Prejudice, Appellants immediately filed a 
"Motion for Reconsideration or Modification of Order Granting 
Motion to Dismiss", in which Appellants sought once again leali 
to amend the Complaints in the event the Court felt the Com· 
plaints were deficient. The Trial Court denied these motions. 
Only then did the Court direct the entry of final judgments 
of dismissal of the Complaints against Respondent. 
Under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(b), 
it is clear that until the Court directed the entry of final 
Judgment in favor of Respondent based upon an express deter· 
mination that no just reason existed for delay, that the Court 
was free to allow Appellants to amend their Complaints or to 
Qr de:: 
revise its previous Orders in any respect as the previous 
of the Court did not dispose of all of the claims of all 
parties to the action. 
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IV. THE LOANS MADE BY APPELLANTS WERE NOT USURIOUS 
AND EVEN IF THE LOANS WERE USURIOUS RECOVERY IS NOT BARRED. 
Respondent's final argument is that even if the 
Appellants were not joint venturers with, but rather loaned 
money to, Call Auto, Appellants are barred from recovery be-
cause under the provisions of the Utah Uniform Consumer Credit 
Code the loans were supposedly "consumer related" loans, and, 
therefore, usurious, void and unenforceable because the finance 
charge exceeded 18%. With respect to Mr. and Mrs. Lowin, for 
example, Respondent argues that even though they loaned Call 
Auto $30,000.00 and were repaid only $750.00, that they are 
barred from any recovery in this action. 
It simply is not true that the loans made by 
Appellants to Call Auto & Equipment Sales, Inc. were "consumer 
related" loans. Section 70B-3-602(1), Utah Code Ann. (1953), 
defines "consumer related loans" as: 
" ••• a loan which is not subject to the 
provisions of this act applying to consumer 
loans and in which the principal does not 
exceed $25,000.00; if the debtor is a person 
other than an organization." [Emphasis added] 
The loans in this action were solicited by Call Auto, the 
interest rates were set by Call Auto without negotiation, the 
loans were made to Call Auto and the loan agreements were 
executed by Call Auto. Respondent attempts to avoid the fact 
that the loans were made to a corporation, arguing that the 
loans were in fact made to the individual Defendants because 
Appellants allege in their Complaints, upon information and 
belief, that at all relevant times Call Auto was the alter ego 
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of the individual Defendants and the separate entity of that 
corporation should be disregarded. This argument is a non 
sequitur. The fact that the individual Defendants may have 
failed to observe the required corporate formalities and that 
the Court may find that it would sanction a fraud or promote 
injustice to recognize the separate corporate entity insofar as 
liability to Appellants is concerned, has nothing to do with 
the existence of the corporation to whom Appellants made the 
loans as a legal entity for other purposes. A party certainly 
cannot avoid liability for a loan by his own formation and 
operation of a sham corporation. 
Moreover, even if the loans had been usurious that 
fact would not render them void and unenforceable as contended 
by Respondent. The sole authority cited by Respondent for this 
proposition, Ross v. Producers Mutual Co., 295 P. 2d 339 (Ut. lj 
provides absolutely no support for Respondent's claim. In 
Ross, the Court held that the fact that an insurance company 
had violated §31-27-15 U.C.A., in issuing a policy, did not 
render the entire contract of insurance void. In reaching that 
conclusion, this Court noted that in determining whether viola· 
tion of a statute renders a contract void, the primary consider' 
tion is whether the statute construed as a whole indicates the 
Legislature intended such a result. In a footnote the Court 
cited as an example of a statute which contained an express 
provision rendering such a contract void, Utah's former Usury 
15 1 6 U C. A However, that statute was repealed Statute, - - , . . 
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in 1955. 4 
In fact, the remedies available to one paying 
usurious interest are expressly spelled out in the Utah 
Uniform Consumer Credit Code. Section ?OB-5-202(3), Utah Code 
Ann. (1953), provides that the debtor is entitled to a refund 
of the excess charge and, under Section ?OB-5-202(4), the 
debtor can recover a penalty if the demand for refund is not 
complied with in a reasonable time. Section 70B-5-202(5) 
goes on to make it clear that the loan is not void by providing 
that, "Except as otherwise provided, no violation of this Act 
impairs rights on a debt." 
Call Auto solicited and obtained loans from Appellants 
and numerous other people at the excessive interest rates set 
by Call Auto without negotiation. Certainly, Appellants and 
the other parties who loaned money to Call Auto were naive and 
gullible to believe that Call Auto could or would repay their 
money let alone pay such interest rates. However, that fact 
certainly should not preclude Appellants from recovery and 
neither Call Auto nor Respondent can avoid liability on the 
basis that the loans were usurious. 
4 In an apparent attempt to prejudice the Court, R7spo~dent 
cites §70B-5-301, Utah Code Anno. (1953), as making i~ ~ 
misdemeanor to willfully charge more than the usury ll.Illit. 
However, the statute only applies to a person.who engages 
in the business of making consumer loans and is clearly 
inapplicable to Appellants. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellants simply ask to be given the opportunity to 
prove at trial what is not disputed by any of the parties to 
the transactions, i.e., that Appellants made secured loans to 
Call Auto & Equipment Sales, Inc. , and that the parties neither 
intended to nor did in fact enter into a joint venture with 
respect to Call Auto's business. Even the cases cited by 
Respondent in its Brief demonstrate that the existence of a 
joint venture is a factual question which must be answered 
by an examination of the entire relationship of the parties. 
Such a factual inquiry is clearly in the interest of justice 
and the inquiry should not be artificially limited because of 
the use of the term "type of joint venture" in Call Auto's 
form agreements or because the Betenson Complaint may not be 
entirely clear as to whether a joint venture is alleged. 
DATED this -:fl.~ day of August, 1981. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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